Alienation (New Directions in Critical Theory)
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The Hegelian-Marxist idea of alienation fell out of favor after the postmetaphysical rejection of humanism and essentialist views of human nature. In this book Rahel Jaeggi draws on the Hegelian philosophical tradition, phenomenological analyses grounded in modern conceptions of agency, and recent work in the analytical tradition to reconceive alienation as the absence of a meaningful relationship to oneself and others, which manifests in feelings of helplessness and the despondent acceptance of ossified social roles and expectations.
A revived approach to alienation helps critical social theory engage with phenomena such as meaninglessness, isolation, and indifference. By severing alienation's link to a problematic conception of human essence while retaining its social-philosophical content, Jaeggi provides resources for a renewed critique of social pathologies, a much-neglected concern in contemporary liberal political philosophy. Her work revisits the arguments of Rousseau, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger, placing them in dialogue with Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, and Charles Taylor.
surgery52—at least for Foucault self-invention also represents a potential for resistance. Considered in this way, producing oneself is a strategy of the subject for not simply abandoning itself without resistance to formation through power (which at the same time constitutes it). SELF-INVENTION VERSUS SELF-APPROPRIATION How, then, does this interpretation of the relation to self differ from the model of self-appropriation put forward here? And to what extent does it make a diagnosis of
Self. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. Marx, Karl. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts.” In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Karl Marx Friedrich Engels Collected Works 3:229–348. New York: International, 1975. . FirstVersion of Capital. In Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Marx Friedrich Engels Collected Works 28. New York: International, 1986. . The Grundrisse. Translated by David McLellan. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Matzner, Jutta. “Der Begriff der Charaktermaske bei Karl Marx.”
coquettishly, like “a little girl.” How, though, does this help us to solve the second problem regarding the authorization and disowning of desires? The position that emerges from Frankfurt’s account of the person with respect to the authority of desires at first appears to be simple: real willing is not found in lower-level, immediate desires; what one really wills, according to Frankfurt, is what higher-level, reflexive volitions aim at. In the case of H. this means that what is decisive for
requires a critical reconstruction of its conceptual foundations. This book is an attempt at such a reconstruction. It is a reconstruction in two respects: on the one hand, it attempts to articulate the meaning of the concept of alienation in general. On the other hand, this concept must be systematically reinterpreted and conceptually transformed in light of the problems I have mentioned. The book’s project, in other words, is a philosophical reappropriation of a view that for various reasons
freedom to be anything her husband senses the beginning of the dissolution of her personality. (c) What is further correct about the ineluctability thesis—this is the structural argument—is that it is not evident how someone who was not already, and did not already want, something specific could determine herself as something or how someone who did not already have specific dispositions could be able to act. Frankfurt discusses this in his essay “On the Usefulness of FinalEnds”: Someone who has