The Art and Science of Military Deception (Artech House Intelligence and Information Operations)
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It is said that deception among people in a civilized society is something to be loathed even though it seems to be part of human nature; but deception in war is a virtue. Properly designed and executed, stratagems reduce the horrific costs of war. This book is a comprehensive collection of classic articles on deception, hand-picked and expertly introduced by well-known experts on military deception. The purpose of this book is to set in motion a renaissance for using deception as an instrument of statecraft. The various sections are designed to cumulatively provide sufficient breadth and depth on the subject to satisfy both the novice as well as the expert. Packed with expert commentary, interesting background information, and original readings, this book provides the reader with sufficient knowledge to pursue General Eisenhower's vision for the proper role of deception in support of the national interest. It is suitable for military advisors and strategists; military academies; and, government agencies.
Therefore, the planner must develop one or more plausible alternatives as bait for his victim and then employ a range of stratagems to mislead him. “The ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive and wrong.”3 If this ideal cannot be achieved (and this writer believes that it would be a rare situation in which such total deception could be achieved), the mere presenting of alternative solutions nonetheless will serve to confuse the adversary and lead him to
by time (66 percent), and strength (57 percent). The least frequent type of surprise which he found was style, which prevailed in 25 percent of the cases he analyzed. There are nonetheless some very famous examples, including the dropping of the first atomic weapon on Hiroshima, and the introduction of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba. We may close this very inadequate discussion of this approach to types of surprise and deception by observing that one of the greatest and most successful
analysts seeking to avoid surprise will generally wish to try to overcome this bias. The prognosis is not favorable. In one experiment, the bias persisted even after test subjects had been given feedback to show the bias and after they had been urged to try to overcome this tendency in answering a new set of estimation questions.16 This is a common finding in experiments dealing with cognitive biases; the biases persist even after test subjects are informed of them and instructed to try to avoid
current circumstances of an actor, or lack of empathy for whatever reason, causes us to perceive that actor’s behavior as stemming from the nature of the actor. As with all the cognitive biases, we are describing a tendency, not a black and white rule that applies to all people in all cases. In assessing the behavior of others, we normally do make some allowance for situational pressures and role requirements, but this allowance is often insufficient. A principal implication for international
piercing judgment of Augustus; nor the extreme caution or closenesse of Tiberius. These properties, of Arts or Policy, and Dissimulation or Closenesse, are indeed habits and faculties severall, and to be distinguished. For if a man have that penetration of judgment as he can discerne what things are to be laid open, and what to be secretted, and what to be shewed at halfe lights, and to whom, and when, (which indeed are arts of State, and arts of Life, as Tacitus well calleth them); to him, a