Bulletproof SSL and TLS: Understanding and Deploying SSL/TLS and PKI to Secure Servers and Web Applications
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
FULLY REVISED IN AUGUST 2015.
Bulletproof SSL and TLS is a complete guide to using SSL and TLS encryption to deploy secure servers and web applications. Written by Ivan Ristic, the author of the popular SSL Labs web site, this book will teach you everything you need to know to protect your systems from eavesdropping and impersonation attacks.
In this book, you'll find just the right mix of theory, protocol detail, vulnerability and weakness information, and deployment advice to get your job done:
- Comprehensive coverage of the ever-changing field of SSL/TLS and Internet PKI, with updates to the digital version
- For IT security professionals, help to understand the risks
- For system administrators, help to deploy systems securely
- For developers, help to design and implement secure web applications
- Practical and concise, with added depth when details are relevant
- Introduction to cryptography and the latest TLS protocol version
- Discussion of weaknesses at every level, covering implementation issues, HTTP and browser problems, and protocol vulnerabilities
- Coverage of the latest attacks, such as BEAST, CRIME, BREACH, Lucky 13, RC4 biases, Triple Handshake Attack, and Heartbleed
- Thorough deployment advice, including advanced technologies, such as Strict Transport Security, Content Security Policy, and pinning
- Guide to using OpenSSL to generate keys and certificates and to create and run a private certification authority
- Guide to using OpenSSL to test servers for vulnerabilities
- Practical advice for secure server configuration using Apache httpd, IIS, Java, Nginx, Microsoft Windows, and Tomcat
This book is available in paperback and a variety of digital formats without DRM. Digital version of Bulletproof SSL and TLS can be obtained directly from the author, at feistyduck.com.
Safari Yes v7 (iOS 7 on September 2013 and OS X 10.9 on October 2013). Experimental support since v6 in Mountain Lion.[f] [a] Content Security Policy (Can I use, retrieved 29 June 2014) [b] Chrome 25 Beta: Content Security Policy and Shadow DOM (The Chromium Blog, 14 January 2013) [c] New Chromium security features, June 2011 (The Chromium Blog, 14 June 2011) [d] Content Security Policy 1.0 lands in Firefox Aurora (Mozilla Hacks, 29 May 2013) [e] Shutting Down XSS with Content
that they are using the right one. MITM certificates are easily detected. Secure deployment of private roots If you can securely pin the server certificate, then you can just as well pin any other certificate in the chain. That means that you can create your own root certificate and make users agents trust it—but only for the sites you own. This is a variation of the previous use case and largely of interest to those who have many sites. Rather than pin individual certificates (of which there
significant limiting factor for any cryptographic operation. OpenSSL comes with a built-in benchmarking tool that you can use to get an idea about a system’s capabilities and limits. You can invoke the benchmark using the speed command. If you invoke speed without any parameters, OpenSSL produces a lot of output, little of which will be of interest. A better approach is to test only those algorithms that are directly relevant to you. For example, for usage in a secure web server, you might care
strong momentum to change things. Since then, the momentum has been replaced with the realization that we’re dealing with a very difficult problem. It’s easy to design a system that works most of the time, but it’s the edge cases where most ideas fail. The proposals based on notaries face issues with browser APIs just to get off the ground. They aim to solve the problem of local attacks but have too many caveats. By depending on multiple external systems for trust, they make decision making
encountered a certificate that did not match with the hardcoded built-in list their browser communicated the entire offending certificate chain back to Google. With access to the chain, they were able to link the rogue certificate to TURKTRUST, a Turkish certification authority. The invalid subordinate certificates were promptly revoked by all parties. TURKTRUST published a detailed report only a couple of days later and continued to provide regular updates. We learned that a mistake