Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC
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The streams of Greek history in the fourth century are highly controversial. Sandwiched between the Classical fifth century and the Hellenistic period, the era has invited various readings, most prominently the verdict of decrepitude and decline. Recent discoveries, however, indicate that the period was not simply illustrative of the political, social, and economic weaknesses of the Greek city-state. This book examines the fourth century from an area with its own regional dynamics: central Greece, a region often considered as a backwater for macro-politics. The authors disclose a vivid tension between regional politics in Boeotia and its adjacent territories and Greek affairs. They provide a meticulous and, at times, microscopic investigation into the region's military and political history, together with detailed analyses of the topography of the places 'where history was made.' The result is a dazzling account of Greece's power transition crisis on the eve of the Macedonian conquest.
proportion (contra Jehne 1994, pp. 187–192, who sees their purpose as purely military). In this regard, the League was organized along the lines of the Boeotian Confederacy. See chapter 18. See McInerney 1999, whose vivid description of Phocis (pp. 40–119) is in many ways typical of central Greece. For lines of communications and roads in Boeotia see Buckler 1980a, pp. 4–14. Prologue 29 developed their own dynamism that altered interstate relations everywhere from central Greece to the
uncertain.9 F. Schober was the first to eliminate the sacred land of Crisa, the northern extent of which he considered unknown.10 Although the Greek Civil War in 1946–7 prevented L. Lerat from exploring this area in detail,11 G. J. Szemler in his careful study of the region places the northern boundary of the sacred precinct not far south of Amphissa on a line between the ridges of Koutrouli and Likovouni on the east and the easternmost spur of Mt. Ghiona on the west.12 One can add that the small
other sources agree that such depredations were parts of the episode. Apart from naming the Amphissans and the otherwise unknown Sodamas, and omitting Galaxidorus, Pausanias’ details agree entirely with those found in Xenophon. The differences must come at least in part from Pausanias’ use of an unknown source, presumably the one in which he found Sodamas’ name. Yet at the same time his account has nothing in common with that of the Historian. A major discrepancy between the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia
to lead enough troops to the right to grapple with the entire Theban column. Instead, he was forced to deploy his men laterally, and to do so successfully he needed time.57 He ordered his cavalry 55 56 57 Plut. Pel. 23, 1; Diod. Sic. 15, 55, 2; Wolter 1926, p. 314; Adcock 1962a, p. 25. Cawkwell 1972, pp. 261–262, spoke of Epaminondas’ right wing as a reserve, but it can more properly be described as refused: cf. Delbru¨ck 1920, p. 156; Tarn 1930, p. 8. Although Pritchett 1965–92, vol. I , pp.
time to compose a speech, and with the enemy drawing themselves up in battle array Archidamus had little time for a long, elaborate address, especially one which he was to deliver twelve times. Nor would one normally expect rhetorical elegance, sophistication, and originality from a Spartan, especially one with more pressing things than oratory on his mind. Ordinary though these sentiments are, they are under the circumstances ta deonta. Pertinent in this respect is the observation of Thucydides