Cyberwar and Information Warfare
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Integrating empirical, conceptual, and theoretical approaches, this book presents the thinking of researchers and experts in the fields of cybersecurity, cyberdefense, and information warfare.
The aim of this book is to analyze the processes of information warfare and cyberwarfare through the historical, operational and strategic perspectives of cyberattacks.
Cyberwar and Information Warfare is of extreme use to experts in security studies and intelligence studies, defense universities, ministries of defense and security, and anyone studying political sciences, international relations, geopolitics, information technologies, etc.
through the movement of men and weapons from the other side of a border (possibly to conquer it and push back the said line), to the movements of invisible electrons which affect computers located over a territory. Information can be used to damage things (putting computing or communication means out of order), to change or take pieces of information, and finally, to affect people, bully them, shock them, or send them into disarray, but not by killing them directly. This takes us back to the
raises the question of what a strategic surprise should be. In such conditions, it should undoubtedly involve massive attacks on the entire 34 In this example, a single strike is considered to be self-sufficient. Except if it is coupled with a guerrilla strategy, terrorism essentially has a semiotic value, of expression a political position by the one implementing it. Creating a strong impression, it is considered as a poor strategy in terms of the potentiality that it offers its user and tends,
side by putting them into sea containers also allows them to imagine using them without a classic military attack taking place beforehand. Information Warfare and Strategic Surprise 107 The German invasion on the USSR in 1941 thus relied on a finely balanced combination of a doctrinal corpus and relatively well tested capacities from September 1939 (which the USSR also contributed to). It takes it roots from Hitler’s desire to conquer and to make Europe submit to the Nazi order, whose content
Institut de Stratégie Comparée, Economica, Paris, France, 1997. [FUL 07] FULGHUM D., “Why Syria’s air defense failed to detect Israelis”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14th 2007. [GER 97] GÉRÉ F., Demain la guerre, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, France, 1997. [GER 00] GÉRÉ, F., “RMA or new operational art? A view from France”, in GONGORA, T., VON RIECKHOFF, H., Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?, Greenwood Press, Westport/London, UK, 2000. [GOO 05] GOODMAN M., “9/11: The failure of
the pure mathematical calculation of the resources involved: the number of individuals, the millions of Euros or Dollars invested in developing means for attacks and cybernetic defense, the number of exercises (CDX) performed every year, etc. This appreciation of power must use several different approaches and multiply the perspectives. The Internet penetration rate within populations can, then, be used as a force and vulnerability index of these States. In fact: Internet using citizens are