Four Seminars (Studies in Continental Thought)
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In Four Seminars, Heidegger reviews the entire trajectory of his thought and offers unique perspectives on fundamental aspects of his work. First published in French in 1976, these seminars were translated into German with Heidegger’s approval and reissued in 1986 as part of his Gesamtausgabe, volume 15. Topics considered include the Greek understanding of presence, the ontological difference, the notion of system in German Idealism, the power of naming, the problem of technology, danger, and the event. Heidegger’s engagements with his philosophical forebears―Parmenides, Heraclitus, Kant, and Hegel―continue in surprising dialogues with his contemporaries―Husserl, Marx, and Wittgenstein. While providing important insights into how Heidegger conducted his lectures, these seminars show him in his maturity reflecting back on his philosophical path. An important text for understanding contemporary philosophical debates, Four Seminars provides extraordinarily rich material for students and scholars of Heidegger.
the way things belong to each other in the midst of a “common presence” (“commune présence”31), as day and night are joined to one another in the manner we saw. In this regard, kísmoV does not name something that would be larger than the other things and inside of which they all would ¤nd their space, but a way of being. Diels was also quite right when, in his presentation of the poem of Parmenides in 1897, he remarked, “For the philosophers of the ¤fth century, from Heraclitus on, kísmoV does
time, in order to forestall them (their ¤xed dichotomy). What is thus expressed is a “positing” which is no longer the simple opposition of the opposites, nor the simple unity itself posited of opposites, in opposition to which another opposition arises which itself demands a new unity, but a unity such that it contains in itself all oppositions. This is, in the ¤nal analysis, the sense of the central speculative expression: “in¤nite world-intuition.” If, on the basis of this now clari¤ed
being of beings, a fundamental determination for the entirety of philosophical thinking: being, that is, presencing. Neither Plato nor Aristotle put into question this determination, which for them is simply manifest. The entire history of metaphysics is organized from here as the succession of the various fundamental ¤gures of the being of beings, on the basis of the original determination where “being” is apprehended as parousÖa. Thus the entire history of metaphysics proves itself to be the
ἀντικείμενον already stands, that is, lies before – and from itself. The Greek experience does not yet require that representation play a role in the positing of a being. That beings are, the Greeks think this from out of φύσις – which Aristotle interprets from ποίησις as a bringing-forth into the open. One needs to distinguish from this Greek notion of poiêsis the modern notion of production, which means: to set into availability. 2) The second addendum bears on Marx. The sentence cited
that this is the only possible access both to the ìín and to ål±qeia. In any case, this is what Parmenides says, in fragment 1, verse 28: “It is necessary that you experience all things.” Parmenides says here puqèsqai. It is not an ordinary experience, but authentic experience, the one spoken of in verse 1 of fragment 6: “Saying (the letting-show-itself) and perceiving (what is accomplished with this) are necessary”— CrÆ tó lègein te noe¢n This experience, and what it safeguards, is precisely