Hegel Contra Sociology (Radical Thinkers)
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A radical new assessment of Hegel revealing the problems and limitations of sociological method.
Gillian Rose is among the twentieth century’s most important social philosophers. In perhaps her most significant work, Hegel Contra Sociology, Rose mounts a forceful defence of Hegelian speculative thought. Demonstrating how, in his criticisms of Kant and Fichte, Hegel supplies a preemptive critique of Weber, Durkheim, and all of the sociological traditions that stem from these “neo-Kantian” thinkers, Rose argues that any attempt to preserve Marxism from a similar critique and any attempt to renew sociology cannot succeed without coming to terms with Hegel’s own speculative discourse. With an analysis of Hegel’s mature works in light of his early radical writings, this book represents a profound step toward enacting just such a return to the Hegelian.
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general logic be established except logically? In short, both of these projects can only be accomplished by use of the very capacities whose right use is precisely to be justified. Hence it is necessary to begin in a different way: one which acknowledges the unavoidable circularity of any examination of cognition and which derives the social and historical preconditions of cognition systematically suppressed by both the Kantian and neo-Kantian approaches. Metacritique turns the neo-Kantian
discussed in the previous chapter, and, on the other hand, the absolute is misrepresented as a conception of ‘God’. This divorce in the idea of the absolute, as the state and as religion, itself indicates the real lack of freedom. The absolute can only be re-presented in terms of the prevailing dualisms, in terms of the domination between concept and intuition, between legal person (master) and thing (slave). The speculative proposition that religion and the state are identical implies the
Antigone pronounces her own judgement, Because we suffer, we acknowledge that we have erred.56 She thus recognizes that her suffering is not the effect of her personal caprice, nor is it caused by the arbitrary and unjust power of the state. She acknowledges that it arises out of the conflict of two equally just ethical powers. She does not fully comprehend her suffering because her pathos is that of the family, but she acknowledges the right of the powers she defies as she acknowledges her own
forms of consciousness. Phenomenological necessity means that we can see what consciousness considers ‘in-itself’, whether the ideal of love, or a 168 WORK AND REPRESENTATION characterless God or an abstract principle of political unity, as not ‘in-itself’, but as ‘for it’, defined by consciousness as ‘in-itself’. We can see that this illusion resulted from the loss of what was truly ‘in-itself’ and which became ‘for it’, solely within consciousness and no longer concrete life itself. The
determination of substance, a causality of fate. We will see that the law of our determination can be comprehended and that the determination is the product of a law which is outside the oppositions of our self-consciousness. The Phenomenology is not the revocation of alienated externalization, nor a teleology of reconciliation, nor a dominating absolute knowledge. The Phenomenology is not a success, it is a gamble. For the perpetual occurrence of inversion and misrepresentation can only be