Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology of Being (MIT Press)
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
The idea of place--topos--runs through Martin Heidegger's thinking almost from the very start. It can be seen not only in his attachment to the famous hut in Todtnauberg but in his constant deployment of topological terms and images and in the situated, "placed" character of his thought and of its major themes and motifs. Heidegger's work, argues Jeff Malpas, exemplifies the practice of "philosophical topology." In Heidegger and the Thinking of Place, Malpas examines the topological aspects of Heidegger's thought and offers a broader elaboration of the philosophical significance of place. Doing so, he provides a distinct and productive approach to Heidegger as well as a new reading of other key figures--notably Kant, Aristotle, Gadamer, and Davidson, but also Benjamin, Arendt, and Camus. Malpas, expanding arguments he made in his earlier book Heidegger's Topology (MIT Press, 2007), discusses such topics as the role of place in philosophical thinking, the topological character of the transcendental, the convergence of Heideggerian topology with Davidsonian triangulation, the necessity of mortality in the possibility of human life, the role of materiality in the working of art, the significance of nostalgia, and the nature of philosophy as beginning in wonder. Philosophy, Malpas argues, begins in wonder and begins in place and the experience of place. The place of wonder, of philosophy, of questioning, he writes, is the very topos of thinking.
merely on the ubiquity of spatial metaphors nor on any “imaginative projection” of spatial images and figures onto other domains, but instead arises out of close consideration of the concepts and structures at issue here—it is the inevitable conclusion to which any rigorous and consistent analysis of “being-in-the-world” must lead. 2. This is a problem discussed at a number of places in this volume (notably in Part I), but see also Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
the basis of the considerations set out in n. 2 above, what we take to be a specification of the material objectivity of a thing could never function as a starting point here, since what we take the thing to be in its material objectivity is dependent on how we understand the thing in the first place—on that to which we are attentive in the thing. 14. The work by Cozens reproduced here shows the two Paestum temples as desolate ruins with three figures apparently fleeing before them. Piranesi’s
Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 28. 12. Notice that this form of “mimesis” is not mere “imitation,” but realization. See Gadamer’s discussion of mimesis in Truth and Method, pp. 110–121. 13. David Rothenberg writes of the difference between philosophy and poetry that “It is not that one seeks to explain, while the other evokes. It is that the former must ask and ask, and keep on asking, until our very sense of perplexity becomes exact, complete, not
and Massey, or, indeed, in Lefebvre and Foucault, Heidegger must be considered essential reading. Yet although Relph and I seem to be in agreement on the importance of Heidegger as a central figure in the thinking of place, we disagree in our assessments of just what is most significant in Heidegger’s treatment of place. Focusing on the concept of dwelling that looms so large in Heidegger’s later thinking, Relph observes that while he finds this aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy “appealing
Metaphysics, but it also deals with aspects of Kant’s treatment of space and time, as well as with Jakob von Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt. Of all the essays contained here, this has perhaps a slightly more polemical air to it than any of the others, in that it is partly directed against the pragmatist reading of Heidegger associated with the work of Hubert Dreyfus—although even here any polemic is very much in the background (and mostly confined to the notes). Von Uexküll appears again in the