Inside Cyber Warfare: Mapping the Cyber Underworld
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
When the Stuxnet computer worm damaged the Iranian nuclear program in 2010, the public got a small glimpse into modern cyber warfare—without truly realizing the scope of this global conflict. Inside Cyber Warfare provides fascinating and disturbing details on how nations, groups, and individuals throughout the world increasingly rely on Internet attacks to gain military, political, and economic advantages over their adversaries.
This updated second edition takes a detailed look at the complex domain of cyberspace, and the players and strategies involved. You’ll discover how sophisticated hackers working on behalf of states or organized crime patiently play a high-stakes game that could target anyone, regardless of affiliation or nationality.
- Discover how Russian investment in social networks benefits the Kremlin
- Learn the role of social networks in fomenting revolution in the Middle East and Northern Africa
- Explore the rise of anarchist groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec
- Look inside cyber warfare capabilities of nations including China and Israel
- Understand how the U.S. can legally engage in covert cyber operations
- Learn how the Intellectual Property war has become the primary focus of state-sponsored cyber operations
Jeffrey Carr, the founder and CEO of Taia Global, Inc., is a cyber intelligence expert and consultant who specializes in the investigation of cyber attacks against governments and infrastructures by state and non-state hackers.
should be modeled after the Chemical Weapons treaty or other Arms Control-type treaties, whereas the U.S. would prefer to engage international law enforcement in cooperating more closely to catch cyber criminals. Many cyber criminals are also engaged as non-state hackers during times of cyber conflict, so this strategy would have a two-tiered benefit of securing the Web against acts of cyber crime and cyber warfare. 34 | Chapter 3: The Legal Status of Cyber Warfare One Russian argument against
shackles or legal authorities that employees and contractors of the intelligence community are. Volunteers are vetted not by their ability to receive a Top Secret/SCI with Full Scope Polygraph clearance; they are vetted by their peers who know and trust them and by the quality of the work they produce, which often speaks for itself. I have had the opportunity to broach this subject many times during briefings that I provided to various agencies within the IC. Since these were unclassified
its practice of distancing itself from the Russian nationalistic hacker community thus gaining deniability while passively supporting and enjoying the strategic benefits of their actions. While forum members are quite open about their targets and methods, we were unable in this round of collection/analysis to find any references to state organizations guiding or directing attacks. There are several possible explanations as to why this is the case. There was no external involvement or direction
checking WHOIS registrations does provide another link in the evidence chain. Sometimes mistakes are made and actual government websites are used as the identifying data (e.g., GhostNet). This is rare, but it does happen. Part of any OSINT investigation is looking for the small oversights that even the most careful individuals make from time to time. The Cambridge University investigation of the Chinese espionage operation against the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) underscores the
Radiological Information Exchange Madame Chairperson: While we do not believe that this is a matter that rightfully falls under the province of your Committee, in the interest of cooperation, this letter will address the events leading up to the establishment of the North American Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (NAURIE). As you know, on the nth year anniversary of 9/11, all of our nation’s nuclear power plants were targeted in a massive distributed denial of service attack orchestrated