Introducing Consciousness: A Graphic Guide
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Introducing Consciousness starts with the problem of the philosophical relation between mind and matter, explains the historical origins of this problem, and traces different scientific attempts to explain consciousness. Along the way, readers will be introduced to zombies and Chinese Rooms, ghosts in machines and Schrodinger's cat.
Still, materialists have an answer. They can say that Kripke and Jackson only establish a difference at the level of concepts, not a difference at the level of the properties themselves. Materialists will allow that we have two different ways of thinking about mental properties: we can think of them as conscious, and we can think of them as material. But materialists will deny that there are actually two properties here, as opposed to one property thought about in two ways. 101 Again, take
methods, and not raising any insurmountable philosophical obstacles. 19 So, for example, we might analyse pain as a state that is typically caused by bodily damage, and which typically causes a desire to avoid further damage. Then we can investigate how pain is realized in humans by a system of A-fibre and C-fibre transmissions, and by different physiological systems in other animals. Similar objective studies can be carried out for other psychological processes like vision, hearing, memory,
chimps, but it is tricky to test chimps for a theory of mind, since they can't use words to tell you where they think Sally will look. In any case, even if chimps and other apes do have a theory of mind, other mammals undoubtedly don't. Cats and dogs, for example, certainly can't think about minds. This means, in particular, that they can't think about their own minds, and so, according to HOT theories of consciousness, are not conscious. 158 Cultural Training Some thinkers are happy to
this basis. 164 But what if there is no signature, no salient feature common to conscious human states? This seems just as likely. There may be no feature common to the states that we humans identify as conscious. Apart, that is, from their being identified as conscious, from their having the minimal common feature of introspective accessibility and reportability. If that is all there is, then we will be stymied with non-human creatures once more. But how then are we to decide exactly which
various possible results. Albert Einstein (1879-1955) hated this idea. Still, this quantum mechanical indeterminism doesn't really help dualism. As long as prior physical causes so much as fix the probabilities of physical results, independent mental influences will still be ruled out. 74 Imagine, for the sake of argument, that independent conscious events conscious decisions, perhaps - did take advantage of the indeterministic space created by quantum mechanics to influence the movements of