Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement: The Shocking True Story of the Military Intelligence Failure at Pearl Harbor and the Fourteen Men Responsible for the Disaster
Bruce Lee, Henry C. Clausen
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“We might have possessed the genius to break the Purple code, but in 1941 we didn’t have the brains to know what to do with it.” —Henry C. Clausen, special investigator for secretary of war Henry L. Stimson
On December 6, 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, assured his staff that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor. The next morning, Japanese carriers steamed toward Hawaii to launch one of the most devastating surprise attacks in the history of war, proving the admiral disastrously wrong. Immediately, an investigation began into how the American military could have been caught so unaware.
The results of the initial investigation failed to implicate who was responsible for this intelligence debacle. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, realizing that high-ranking members of the military had provided false testimony, decided to reopen the investigation by bringing in an unknown major by the name of Henry C. Clausen. Over the course of ten months, from November 1944 to September 1945, Clausen led an exhaustive investigation. He logged more than fifty-five thousand miles and interviewed over one hundred military and civilian personnel, ultimately producing an eight-hundred-page report that brought new evidence to light. Clausen left no stone unturned in his dogged effort to determine who was truly responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor.
Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement reveals all of the eye-opening details of Clausen’s investigation and is a damning account of massive intelligence failure. To this day, the story surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor stokes controversy and conspiracy theories. This book provides conclusive evidence that shows how the US military missed so many signals and how it could have avoided the events of that fateful day.
the country, it should be known that there was evidently some jealousy between the services, and this existed prior to Pearl Harbor.” “You mean it existed in Washington, Hawaii and the Philippines?” asked Ferguson. “That is what I understand,” I said. “In other words, what a ludicrous situation is presented if you have a fleet intelligence officer, Captain Layton, saying he gave information to Colonel Raley but would not tell Raley where it came from! How could Colonel Raley know how to
(Purple-CA) #865 Re my #85732 1. The date set in my message #81233 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is only for your information.) 2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as
the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations. The American government not only rejected to above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called “Introducer” of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on
received by the addressee in Hawaii. Furthermore, the cross-checking system used by the Signal Corps showed that the Hawaiian Department on that day had sent its usual confirming message accounting for all the cable traffic it received each day by referring to the numbers assigned the messages. This showed that no repeat transmission was necessary for message number 519, meaning the message had been received by Hawaii. So far as Washington G-2 was concerned, message number 519 of December 5 had
less than two and one-half days to confer. To make things easier for Short, Herron sent to San Francisco a complete briefing book, plus an agenda and exhibits for discussion. This material covered all the aspects of the Hawaiian command. Short was supposed to study it during his five-day voyage to Honolulu. “Upon my meeting Short when he arrived,” said Herron, “I asked him whether he had read the papers and material. He replied that … he had not given them much time while en route.” According