Philosophy of Economics (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science)
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Part of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science Series edited by:
Dov M. Gabbay King's College, London, UK; Paul Thagard University of Waterloo, Canada; and John Woods University of British Columbia, Canada.
Philosophy of Economics investigates the foundational concepts and methods of economics, the social science that analyzes the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. This groundbreaking collection, the most thorough treatment of the philosophy of economics ever published, brings together philosophers, scientists and historians to map out the central topics in the field. The articles are divided into two groups. Chapters in the first group deal with various philosophical issues characteristic of economics in general, including realism and Lakatos, explanation and testing, modeling and mathematics, political ideology and feminist epistemology. Chapters in the second group discuss particular methods, theories and branches of economics, including forecasting and measurement, econometrics and experimentation, rational choice and agency issues, game theory and social choice, behavioral economics and public choice, geographical economics and evolutionary economics, and finally the economics of scientific knowledge. This volume serves as a detailed introduction for those new to the field as well as a rich source of new insights and potential research agendas for those already engaged with the philosophy of economics.
Popper. I have read his Conjectures and Refutations as well as ... The Open Society and Its Enemies. I think those are the two main things of Popper’s that I’ve read. ... J.D.H. I noticed that in the New Palgrave  Alan Walters says that in your 1953 methodology essay you introduced Popper’s philosophy of science to economics. Would that be an overstatement, then? M.F. No. My introduction to Popper did not come from writings. I met him in person in 1947 at the first meeting of the Mont
and its medium of expression) into affordances. This is particularly evident in analogical modelling, where the artefactual constraints of both content and model language may hold inflexibly. Whether the model is an analogical one or not, scientists use their models in such a way that they can gain understanding and draw inferences from “manipulating” their models by using its constraints, not just its resources, to their advantage. It is this experimentable dimension of models that accounts for
understood to be represented reasonably correctly in the model. Philosophically, it seems a more safe option to assume that this is the case, because then as a result of deductive inference one can assume that the results achieved depict at least one aspect of the total behaviour of the system under study. However, such an approach needs to assume that economic phenomena are separable, and that models provide us with some of the components, and that their arrangements are exhibited in the real
interested in finding out the science-independent matters of fact about existence and Realism and Antirealism about Economic 7 truth; and that, prescriptively, scientists are to be urged to be so interested. And this — with qualifications — is all minimal realism is asking for. One motive for formulating a minimal version of scientific realism is the recognition of diversity among scientific disciplines and research fields — not just any diversity, but one that has consequences for issues of
relations is analogous or disanalogous to another depends on the level of description we are using. So at the most abstract level it is a trivial truth that functional explanations are indeed analogous to Darwinian evolutionary systems in so far as they are causal systems. They are disanalogous in that social entities have no DNA that replicates. But then the HIV virus has no DNA either (it is an RNA virus). We find analogous processes in DNA and RNA organisms despite the differences because we