State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III
Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub
Bob Woodward's third # 1 New York Times bestseller on President George W. Bush's wars tells the detailed, behind-the-scenes story of how the Bush administration failed to tell the truth about the Iraq War.
It was growing into a fortress, old friends and retired military officers. First was Stephen Cambone, a 6-foot-3 defense intellectual who had worked closely on Rumsfeld’s space and missile defense commissions in the 1990s. Cambone was named Rumsfeld’s top civilian assistant. Second was Martin Hoffman, who had been Rumsfeld’s roommate and fellow member of the Princeton Class of 1954, and who had been secretary of the army during Rumsfeld’s first Pentagon tour. The two men had been close friends
diverse as Customs, the Coast Guard and the Secret Service, wanted in on this action. The CEOs began saying, look, we’ll do this once but not three times. The FBI’s formal subpoenas tended to trump the other efforts. The main conflict was between the FBI and the CIA. Part of the arrangement Tenet had made involved the CIA’s National Resources Division, which had personnel stationed in a dozen major U.S. cities so that the CIA could interview and recruit foreigners visiting the United States.
of it, as he continued to rip Myers up one side and down the other. Quinn looked at the clock and recalls it registered 7:02 A.M. The Powell-Rumsfeld-Rice conference call was coming up in 13 minutes. When it was over, Myers walked out and turned to Quinn. “What the hell is going on?” Quinn filled him in, and Myers flew down to get a copy of the message, which he brought back to Rumsfeld’s office in time for the conference call. After the call, Rumsfeld came on the squawk box in Quinn’s office.
HADLEY, WHO WAS NOW 57, was also thinking about change. He wanted out. As the end of the first term approached, he had a couple of conversations with Armitage about the virtue of leaving. The worst thing, Armitage said, would be for a deputy to be promoted to the top spot. “Don’t do it,” Armitage warned. Hadley said he agreed. The number one and the number two jobs were different, requiring different skills. He also felt that it was important for a second-term president to demonstrate that he
as administration policy before the plan to go after bin Laden. RUMSFELD WORKED WEEKENDS. One Saturday in early August 2001 he summoned Shelton, the operations director, and all the section chiefs involved in the 68 war plans on the shelf, including the major war plans for Iraq and North Korea. It was a grueling session. Rumsfeld wanted to examine the assumptions. “I sat there and these people couldn’t believe it,” he told me in an interview. “It took most of the day. And then one colonel