The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade (Oxford Handbooks)
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The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade surveys the literature on the politics of international trade and highlights the most exciting recent scholarly developments. The Handbook is focused on work by political scientists that draws extensively on work in economics, but is distinctive in its applications and attention to political features; that is, it takes politics seriously. The Handbook's framework is organized in part along the traditional lines of domestic society-domestic institutions - international interaction, but elaborates this basic framework to showcase the most important new developments in our understanding of the political economy of trade. Within the field of international political economy, international trade has long been and continues to be one of the most vibrant areas of study. Drawing on models of economic interests and integrating them with political models of institutions and society, political scientists have made great strides in understanding the sources of trade policy preferences and outcomes. The 27 chapters in the Handbook include contributions from prominent scholars around the globe, and from multiple theoretical and methodological traditions. The Handbook considers the development of concepts and policies about international trade; the influence of individuals, firms, and societies; the role of domestic and international institutions; and the interaction of trade and other issues, such as monetary policy, environmental challenges, and human rights. Showcasing both established theories and findings and cutting-edge new research, the Handbook is a valuable reference for scholars of political economy.
low when compared to the gains from existing protection. More contemporary research has thus sought to explain which industries can lobby and whether modeling the lobbying decision more closely can improve model fit. Bombardini (2008), for example, notes that larger firms (relative to the size of the industry) internalize more of the benefits from lobbying, so that industries with a small number of relatively large firms are likely to be able to lobby more effectively. She then uses the
accounted for and appreciated, is that such wetlands may play unexpectedly critical roles in sustaining a larger ecosystem than had been previously understood. Data Sources Only relatively recently have panel data for product-level trade policy instruments for many countries become publicly and freely available and widespread enough for a wide group of political-economic researchers to access. Important sources for product-level applied and bound tariff data across countries include the WTO’s
Similarly, Henisz and Mansfield 124 Labor and Protectionist Sentiment (2006) examine the effects of unemployment on trade openness, conditional on the number of institutional constraints. They find that trade openness decreases as unemployment rises in democracies, though this effect is attenuated as the number of veto players increases. Together this research suggests that democratic governments are responsive to domestic protectionist pressures, though the degree of responsiveness varies
Creation of standing body 6 Sanctions cross-sector 14 14 17 17 17 18 Sanctions within sector Mediation provision Defendant chooses amount Restriction to one forum Provision on forum shopping Delegation to external body 19 21 Third party chooses amount Arbitration provision 36 Complainant chooses amount 47 Provision on sanctions 51 79 Consultation provision Some type of dispute settlement 83 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Percentage of PTAs Fig. 8.1 Variation in DSP Design
Anderson, Rausser, and Swinnen 2013). The political consequence of higher food imports and a shrinking domestic agricultural sector is that a smaller nucleus of remaining farmers is easier to organize. However, this statement of the literature serves to highlight the central issue in studying the political economy of industry-level protection. We lack a unifying framework that would explain why it is that certain interest groups become politicized around trade and effective as lobbies, while