The Priority of Events: Deleuze's Logic of Sense (Plateaus -- New Directions in Deleuze Studies)
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An incisive analysis of Deleuze's philosophy of eventsSean Bowden shows how the Deleuzian event should be understood in terms of the broader metaphysical thesis that substances are ontologically secondary with respect to events. He achieves this through a reconstruction of Deleuze's relation to the history of thought from the Stoics through to Simondon, taking account of Leibniz, Lautman, structuralism and psychoanalysis along the way.This exciting new reading of Deleuze focuses firmly on his approach to events. Bowden also examines and clarifies a number of Deleuze's most difficult philosophical concepts, including sense, problematic Ideas and intensive individuation, and engages with material by Lautman and Simondon that has not yet been translated into English.
actualization of 'fully differential problematic Ideas'. In Chapter 2, we saw how Deleuze extended the Leibnizian notion of the 'point of view' with reference to Nietzschean 'perspectivism', in order to argue that the genesis of the known and knowledge are a matter of 'points of view on points of view'. It has also been seen throughout this present work how Deleuze prioritizes the workings of 'sense' over any direct or naive perceptual realism. And finally, we saw in Chapter 3 how Deleuze
characterizes this early development of the Oedipus complex (see LS, 2 0 0 ) , even if he views it from a perspective slightly different from Klein's. The long paragraph on pages 1 8 7 to 1 8 8 of The Logic of Sense' s 'Twenty-Seventh Series o f Orality' i s a dense statement o f some o f the basic tenets of Kleinian theory, and even duplicates the kind of 'ali mentary and excremental' vocabulary which Klein uses to express her ideas. In short, Klein's work focuses on the way in which the
appears that it is necessary to interpret 'what is', not as the real obj ect, but as the incorporeal fact or true proposition that this obj ect 'is such and such' . If the representation 'p is q ' is comprehensive, this must be because 'p is q ' obtains.9o However, what is the point in saying that the comprehensive representation is to arise from and be imprinted exactly in accordance with 'what is' if 'what is' - the fact - is pre cisely what we seek to know by means of the comprehensive repre
1 969), pp. 66 1-2 . See also G.W. Leibniz, New Essays o n Human Understanding, trans. and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 99 6 ) , III, vi, § 1 2 . This concept of compossibility is fundamental to all of Leibniz's most important works, even if it is not always mentioned by name. See, for example, G.W. Leibniz, Monadology, in Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson, trans. Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson ( London and Toronto: J.M.
water and fire, the volcano spits up only a single reminder of Empedocles - his lead [sic] sandal. To the wings of the Platonic soul the sandal of Elnpedocles is opposed, proving that he was of the earth, under the earth, and autochthonous' ( LS, 128 ) . In opposition to both o f these figures, however, the Stoics, Megarians and Cynics bring about 'a reorientation of all thought and of what it rneans to think: there is no longer any depth or height' ( LS, 130) . For these philosophers, it is