The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances (Studies in Asian Security)
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Tongfi Kim identifies the supply of policy concessions and military commitments as the main factors that explain the bargaining power of a state in a potential or existing alliance. Additionally, three variables of a state's domestic politics significantly affect its negotiating power: whether there is strong domestic opposition to the alliance, whether the state's leader is pro-alliance, and whether that leader is vulnerable. Kim then looks beyond existing alliance literature, which focuses on threats, to produce a deductive theory based on analysis of how the global power structure and domestic politics affect alliances. As China becomes stronger and the U.S. military budget shrinks, The Supply Side of Security shows that these countries should be understood not just as competing threats, but as competing security suppliers.
improved relationship with its ally.33 Systemic and Domestic Aspects of the Alliance Market Systemic Polarity To analyze the dynamics of alliance games at the systemic level, I focus on systemic polarity as Kenneth Waltz did for analyzing adversary games (Waltz 1979).34 Like Waltz, I define polarity by the number of great powers because the number has significant effects on transactions in the alliance market. In international politics, only great powers have sufficient military capabilities to
states have better control of the overall situations outside the intra-alliance relationship. Third, weaker states tend to be more dependent on their allies, and the dependence makes entrapment more likely. In short, stronger states should be more successful in entrapping their allies than weaker states are; hence, there is a larger likelihood of entrapment for weaker states. Many analyses focus on stronger states’ fear of entrapment rather than that of weaker states (for example, Cha 1999, 43;
Neutralist Proalliance Proalliance Neutralist High High Low High Weak Strong Weak Weak Hashimoto Koizumi Opposition Attitude Vulnerability Bargaining power LDP after Kishi Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ) Kan (DPJ) Moderate Weak Weak Weak Proalliance Proalliance Neutralist Moderate Moderate Low High High Moderate Weak Weak Weak the government’s new defense advisory panel” (Green 2010a, 17–18). As the reason for giving up the relocation of the Futenma base out of Okinawa,
Spain for the first time in the bilateral security relationships and provided Spain with the highest level of security guarantee in their history.91 Because the United 160 case studies of domestic politics and alliances States in the past negotiations always referred to Franco as the obstacle to Senate approval, one could alternatively argue that this development was a natural result of Spain’s democratization. The treaty status of the 1976 agreement, however, was not a foregone conclusion
instance, my theory provides alternative explanations to the finding of Leeds, Mattes, and Vogel (2009) that a state is more likely to end its alliance in violation of the terms when a leader with a different supporting coalition comes to power, but the effect is mitigated in democratic regimes. Leeds and her coauthors argue that democratic leaders have stronger constraints against changing the course of foreign policy or are more careful in making commitments, or both. Although these